

Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Working Paper No. 323

The Role Of Transition Assistance: The Case Of Indonesia

Evaluation Team

Jean DuRette
USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation

Glenn Slocum
Associates for Global Change

U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, DC
March 2002 **PN-ACN-766**

Contents

This Working Paper was prepared by Jean DuRette of CDIE and Glenn Slocum of Associates for Global Change based on field work in September 2000. This Working Paper has been summarized in Evaluation Highlights No. 78 (Document Identification No. PN-ACN-767). Both documents can be ordered from USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). To download or order publications, go to www.dec.org and enter the document identification number in the Search box. DEC may also be contacted at 1611 North Kent Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22209; telephone 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039; e-mail docorder@dec.cdie.org. IBI—International Business Initiatives, Inc.— furnished editorial and production assistance.

Executive Summary

The Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) has responsibility for conducting Agency-wide evaluations on assistance topics of interest to USAID managers. In 2000, USAID began an evaluation of the role of transition assistance, with a specific emphasis on the role and activities of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR).

Transition assistance, as used here, refers to the OTI-administered programs providing flexible, short-term responses to help advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict-prone countries. This assistance is usually provided during the two-year critical period after a crisis when countries are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability.

The evaluation includes four studies as well as a broader, synthesis report. This paper discusses findings and lessons learned from the study of transition assistance in Indonesia. It addresses these questions:

- Was the decision to initiate a transition program made in a transparent fashion? Were the proper guidelines considered?

- What were the strengths and weaknesses of transition assistance planning? What was the relationship between transition planning and country strategic planning?

- How was transition assistance implemented in Indonesia? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approach?

- Was the duration of the transition program appropriate? Were transition activities being handed off effectively to other mission or donor development programs?

- Were transition activities achieving their objectives effectively?

Principal Findings

The study concluded on one hand that transition assistance played an important role in helping USAID respond quickly and appropriately with short-term assistance to support postemergency political reform in Indonesia in1998. The elections support was timely and effective. The media-strengthening initiative was effective in informing the public on political issues and in supporting institutional and legal reform. OTI's capacity to identify opportunities and respond immediately to conflict situations enabled the U.S. Government to provide immediate support to peace committees and local groups addressing issues in volatile environments. On the other hand, transition assistance has limitations. It needs to be effectively integrated and coordinated with sustainable development programs. Lessons learned from this country study are addressed below:

Lessons Learned

1. Transition assistance planning needs to balance flexibility with program integration.

Retaining flexibility to experiment and shift emphasis is important in planning transition assistance. But this approach needs to be balanced with greater program integration to reduce overlap, facilitate monitoring and reporting, and ease program handoff. The OTI planning process in Indonesia allowed for flexibility to experiment and to shift emphasis to permit quick and responsive actions. However, the process also led to program overlap with the mission's democracy program, redundant reporting and monitoring systems, and difficulty capturing overall USAID program impact. The FY 2000 strategic plan for Indonesia better adapted the OTI program to the country context and focused the bulk of the efforts on conflict reduction. This change helped reduce program overlap, ease program handoff, and enhance opportunities for integrated monitoring. More effort to integrate monitoring systems would enable USAID/Indonesia to better report on overall results.

2. Enhancing coordination between transition assistance and other programs can encourage integration and cooperation.

It is important to achieve effective coordination between OTI transition assistance and other USAID programs in a country. Effective coordination requires mission leadership, clear definition of roles and authorities, administrative systems that encourage integration and cooperation, and understanding of each other's roles and approaches. In Indonesia, numerous factors initially supported rivalry rather than coordination between the OTI and mission democracy programs. One was USAID/Washington's decision to launch a broader OTI program than recommended by the mission director. Another was the differing structures, roles, and lines of authority for program management under the respective bureaus (the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, which managed transition assistance, and the Asia and Near East Bureau, responsible for other USAID programs). A third factor was the lack of understanding of or appreciation for each other's roles, priorities, and approaches. A fourth factor was the congressional earmark designating OTI as implementer of development assistance funds programmed for Indonesia. Finally, other factors were related to different staff background, experience, and leadership styles.

New mission leadership took several actions to facilitate coordination, including integrating administrative services, clarifying roles and program responsibilities within the 2000 strategic plan, and initiating informal cross-strategic objective teams to coordinate all programs in conflict-prone areas. Another option would have been to place responsibility for all programs directly under the mission director, an approach that enhanced cooperation in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. Lack of an Agency handoff policy creates uncertainty and delay.

The absence of a clear and consistently applied policy on program duration and phaseout provided USAID with considerable flexibility in decisionmaking but also contributed to confusion and uncertainty about OTI's role, postponement of planning for handoff, and delay in identifying options to address conflict over the longer term. The decision to initiate a transition program in

Indonesia was based on consideration of important questions related to effective engagement but did not address program duration. The duration of OTI's program continued to lengthen, going from one to three years. Contributing factors included strong support by other U.S. entities for a continued OTI presence, continuing emergence of violent conflict in various outer islands of Indonesia, and delay in planning for and initiating handoff of a number of OTI initiatives.

Subsequent to the field study, OTI indicated its intent to provide postemergency response programs for a two-year, period when countries are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability. Planning for handoff early, preferably during activity design, would facilitate timelier transfer. Moreover, a clearer policy on duration—including the conditions under which a program would be extended, phased down, or phased out—would help encourage missions and regional bureaus to plan alternative mechanisms for managing OTI initiatives that will continue beyond two years.

4. Linking short-term assistance with institution building can help achieve sustainable results.

Transition assistance that links short-term assistance effectively with institution-building elements has greater potential for achieving sustainable results. Transition assistance was most effective in Indonesia when short-term efforts were linked to longer term sustainable development activities. For example, OTI's media-strengthening initiative effectively supported legal reform and capacity building as well as use of media in short-term activities such as elections, political discussions, and conflict reporting. The mission democracy staff is continuing the institution-strengthening elements for more sustainable results.

5. Transition assistance is no panacea for addressing fundamental issues.

While transition assistance can play an important role in helping quell conflict or its immediate ramifications, it is not a panacea. A sustained, long-term, and broad effort is needed to address the fundamental, deeply rooted political issues that fuel conflict. In Indonesia transition assistance was used to address conflict with small, short-term efforts that helped diminish tensions and encourage constructive action. But the short-term approach cannot address the complex, deeply rooted political issues—such as civilian-military, ethnic, and sectarian relations—that contribute to continuing conflict. A broad-based, sustained approach is needed to address underlying causes of conflict and strengthen democratic institutions. Thus, a combination of short- and long-term approaches appears to be optimum during a transition period.

6. OTI's rapid response mechanism provides quick and flexible assistance.

OTI used the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) indefinite quantities contract to implement short-term transition assistance quickly and flexibly. The approach is less helpful, however, in providing participating organizations opportunities to build institutional capacity in areas such as financial management and procurement. OTI used SWIFT in Indonesia to implement grant activities, including activity programming, financial management, and procurement. The approach facilitated the rapid programming of many small, short-term grants to numerous emerging nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

with weak institutional capacity. Other USAID entities may also use the SWIFT contract for implementing short-term transition activities with emerging organizations.

7. Approaches to monitoring results should be realistic.

Short-term, flexible transition assistance does not always lend itself to the more rigorous monitoring systems characteristic of sustainable development programs. Nevertheless, a realistic approach to monitoring results can realize efficiencies. By September 2000, OTI had identified seven specific results it was seeking in Indonesia, but it had not established a formal monitoring system with indicators and data-collection methods to monitor progress. Furthermore, many of the results OTI sought were too ambitious for it to achieve on its own or were in areas where other mission programs were active. A more realistic approach is to regularly monitor the many small activities only at the output level, collecting informal impact information on an ad hoc basis. Where OTI and other mission programs are targeting similar objectives, a joint integrated monitoring system within the country strategic plan is appropriate.

The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia

Background and Overview

CDIE conducted an assessment of the role of USAID transition assistance with a specific emphasis on the role and activities of the OTI. OTI was established in 1994 to help respond to the increasing number of postcrisis situations. The office has provided assistance to more than 20 countries worldwide. Transition assistance, as used here, refers to OTI-administered programs that provide flexible, short-term responses to help advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict-prone countries. This assistance is usually provided during the critical two-year period after a conflict when countries are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability.

The study addresses the following questions:

- Was the decision to initiate a transition program made in a transparent fashion? Were the proper guidelines considered?

- What were the strengths and weaknesses of transition assistance planning? What was the relationship between transition planning and country strategic planning?

- How was transition assistance implemented in Indonesia? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approach?

- Was the duration of the transition program appropriate? Were transition activities being handed off effectively to other mission or donor development programs?

- Were transition activities achieving their objectives effectively?

The CDIE assessment includes four case studies and a synthesis report. This paper reports on the Indonesia case study. CDIE evaluators visited the country on September 9–19, 2000 to examine how OTI programs are implemented at the country level and their effectiveness. They reviewed documents, visited activities at several sites across Indonesia (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya), and interviewed representatives of USAID, other U.S. Government organizations, other donors, and USAID-funded contractors and grantees. The evaluators also interviewed numerous Washington-based representatives familiar with the OTI program. A separate case study evaluates the program in East Timor.[1]

OTI initiated its program in Indonesia in August 1998 in the aftermath of a deteriorating economy, extensive civil unrest, and the eventual resignation of President Suharto in May

[1] Jean DuRette and Glenn Slocum, "The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor." CDIE Working Paper No. 322, Washington, DC: USAID Document identification PN-ACN-764, January 2002. This document was summarized as Evaluation Highlights No. 77 (USAID Document Identification PN-ACN-765).

1998. Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie assumed power on an interim basis while the country embarked on plans for parliamentary elections in mid-1999 and a transition to democracy. The country faced serious economic and political challenges in moving from a largely autocratic, military-dominated rule to a more open, democratic rule. Increased interethnic strife, interreligious struggle, and provincial movements for independence complicated the political transition.

The objective of the OTI program was to assist USAID/Indonesia with political transition support. Principal activities included elections support, media strengthening, civil society support, civilian-military relations, and conflict mitigation. Funding through FY 2000 totaled approximately $30 million, as summarized in Table 1. Phaseout was programmed to occur in 2000.

Table 1. OTI-Administered Funding
(Values in million dollars)

Fiscal Year	IDA	DA	ESF
1998	4.799		
1999*	1.618	14.955	0.175
2000	8.941	0.042	
Totals:	15.358	14,997	0.175

* Includes East Timor
IDA – International Disaster Assistance
DA – Development Assistance
ESF – Economic Support Funds

Source: Office of Transition Initiatives

Findings and conclusions are organized to address the study's key issues: 1) the process for deciding on engagement, 2) the strengths and weaknesses of the planning process, 3) program implementation, 4) handoff activities, and 5) achieving objectives. This case study concludes with lessons learned.

Was the decision to initiate a transition program made in a transparent fashion? Were the proper guidelines considered?

OTI initiated a program in Indonesia in 1998 on the heels of a major economic and related political crisis. USAID senior management, in consultation with other U.S. Government entities, including the White House, Department of State, National Security Council, and Department of the Treasury, decided that OTI should initiate a program in Indonesia.

In deciding to initiate a program, OTI generally considers five guidelines, as discussed below.[2] Although the evaluation team did not locate a specific document addressing these guidelines for Indonesia, interviews and documents indicate that OTI did indeed consider them. The evaluators found that the three most important factors influencing the decision

[2] OTI, Results Review FY 1998 and Resource Request FY 2001, June 1999, Annex A.

were the significance of the country to U.S. national interests, the ripeness of the country to make a peaceful transition to a democratically elected government, and the presence of an environment sufficiently stable to implement a program.

The guidelines, and their application to the process of deciding to engage in Indonesia, are as follows:

- *Is the country significant to U.S. interests?* The United States has significant economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia, and the Department of State identified Indonesia as one of four countries worldwide whose transition to democracy and long-term stability are of the highest importance. Because stability was threatened and there was an opening to democratic reform, USAID, with broader U.S. Government and congressional support, reversed its process of phasing out development assistance and expanded its support for political reform.

- *Is the situation ripe for OTI assistance?* A combination of economic and political events created an opening for OTI engagement. In 1997 the financial sector of the economy collapsed and investment dried up. Purchasing power plummeted, many businesses failed, unemployment soared, and poverty increased sharply. This led to increasing disillusionment with government performance and a call for political reform. A political crisis ensued. Popular pressure forced long-time President Suharto to resign in May 1998. Vice President Habibie, the appointed successor, agreed to hold new national elections in 1999. President Suharto's resignation was the catalytic event that provided the opening for OTI to assist the country as it embarked on a political transition.

- *Is the operating environment stable enough for OTI's programs to be effective?* Senior USAID management urged OTI to give Indonesia priority as potential for reform developed. In April 1998, USAID sent a team to Indonesia to assess humanitarian needs and identify opportunities for a potential political transition. In May 1998, the U.S. Government evacuated nonessential personnel because of the high level of instability. The USAID administrator and the OTI deputy director visited Indonesia in June 1998 to review the situation. Nonessential personnel were allowed to return later that month. The calmer situation together with the increased openness for media and political activism provided an environment determined sufficiently secure for OTI and reformists to operate.

- *Can OTI address the key political development issues of a transition?* The April 1998 assessment suggested that a political transition was possible and that OTI could help promote it through several activities. OTI initially proposed an approach that would help develop new coalitions and relationships among groups committed to political reform.[3] These groups would be empowered to "work for change in civil society and play a significant role in the time of political transition ahead." By June, with elections scheduled for 1999, OTI proposed additional programs, including election support.

[3] Lehman, e-mail, May 5, 1998. The assessment identified a range of initial ideas for programs: 1) religious cooperation for crisis intervention, 2) civilian-military dialogue, 3) civil society support, and 4) Indonesian Working Forum support.

- *How likely is it that program implementation will result in a successful outcome?* The basis for a positive response to this question is the most difficult to substantiate, but it appears that the decision was based on a combination of economic, political, and other factors. Clearly, the strong commitment and support of the U.S. Government, other donors, and multilateral organizations were influential. Recognition by the Indonesian government that political reform was inevitable also strengthened the possibility for a successful political transition, although the potential for conflict remained.

In considering engagement, OTI applied the above-mentioned questions as informal guidelines rather than as formal guidelines for use in a decisionmaking document. This informal decisionmaking process allowed maximum flexibility to initiate a program quickly in Indonesia. However, the lack of documentation of the process made the decision less transparent. Nor were the guidelines helpful in determining program duration. Congress now requires a report for information purposes; USAID has interpreted this to mean notification on new country programs, including expected activities. A five-day waiting period is observed, but the report is not subject to congressional holds.

In summary, USAID senior management, in consultation with USAID bureau managers and other U.S. Government entities, decided to initiate a transition assistance program in Indonesia after considering a series of informal questions. The answers to these questions were not used as formal guidelines for decisionmaking but more as a guide or checklist. This approach provided USAID maximum flexibility for quick action but not for transparent documentation. Nor was it helpful in determining program duration. A congressional notification now documents planned activities for new country programs.

What were the strengths and weaknesses of transition assistance planning? What was the relationship between transition planning and country strategic planning?

In June 1998, a second OTI team visited Indonesia to plan the program. Planning focused mainly on activities rather than on objectives (results). The plan identified potential interventions, implementing partners, and mechanisms. Priorities identified as central to reform were elections support, strengthening independent media, and strengthening civil society. Elections support was the common focus among these three during the first year. Civilian-military relations and governance activities were also suggested. OTI met with USAID leadership, mission democracy program staff available in Jakarta, and potential partners, including three USAID-financed grantee organizations (two U.S. and one Indonesian) that USAID's democracy and governance (DG) office was supporting. The OTI assistance was to complement mission DG efforts.[4]

The proposed OTI program, particularly its breadth and implementing mechanisms, was an issue between USAID/Indonesia and USAID/Washington. The mission director discussed the proposed activities and the issues with the OTI team, but then notified the Asia and

[4] The country transition plan, approved in November 1998, included a special objective, Democratic Transition Strengthened, to which both OTI and DG programs were to contribute.

Near East Bureau leadership of the mission's "non-concurrence with the [proposed] OTI grants,"[5] instead recommending that OTI 1) limit its involvement to a smaller program in broadcast media; 2) use only one of the three NGOs already holding mission-financed grants; and 3) develop alternative programs with its remaining funds. The director offered to work with the OTI country director to make these programs complementary to mission activities. In the end, however, senior USAID/Washington management decided that OTI should implement its proposed program, apparently because of its faster response capability and the appropriateness of the Indonesian situation to the OTI mandate.

The decision for a broader OTI role than recommended by the mission director set the stage for rivalry, misunderstanding, and lack of ownership of the OTI program by DG staff. It also resulted in program overlap as both OTI and DG staff worked on elections, initiating parallel but similar programs in voter education and civil society support. OTI perceived its approach to elections support as different than pursued by the DG office, but in fact both were implementing similar activities with different NGOs.

OTI shifted emphasis periodically, demonstrating flexibility to experiment and address new topics through NGOs. With parliamentary elections over, OTI initiated support for decentralization to strengthen the capacity of the newly elected local as well as national parliaments. It gave more attention to the civilian-military relations initiative, an area that the mission encouraged OTI to pursue. The media-strengthening effort was to phase down once the DG team initiated a follow-on grant. OTI sought the following results:[6]

- Parliaments gain capacity to manage local area resources under Indonesia's newly decentralized system and undertake training and other initiatives on their own.

- Broader sections of the public, particularly women, are represented in politics at both the local and national level through direct citizen involvement (such as town meetings) and NGO activities.

- OTI-supported NGOs and the media can articulate their messages in policy settings.

- Journalists increase their professionalism and objectivity.

- The military decreases its involvement in civil and political affairs.

As more political and communal crises emerged, OTI shifted its focus to conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution in the outer islands—Aceh, Maluku, West Papua, Sumatra, and

[5]Former USAID/Indonesia mission director, email, July 21, 1998. The mission offered a reasoned, detailed basis for its position, suggesting 1) OTI's engagement in similar, parallel programs would confuse partners and result in "saturation, overlap, and duplication"; 2) OTI would overburden the three grantees already having difficulty implementing the existing mission DG grants; 3) other DG partners (i.e., NDI, IRI, IFES, ACILS) were prepared to do similar activities; 4) OTI resources would "displace mission funds already in place or planned" and postpone implementation of mission programs; 5) additional programs would "risk damage of NGOs' effectiveness…."; 6) OTI staff would be new to Indonesia and therefore unable to seize the critical underlying realities of Indonesia rapidly enough to be effective; and 7) by focusing on the one, unaddressed, area of broadcast media, OTI could provide complementary assistance to the existing capacities in place.

[6] USAID/BHR/OTI, Results Review FY 1999, May 2000, Annex A, Indonesia/East Timor.

East Nusa Tenggara[7]—adding the objective of "increased access to accurate, objective information, thereby reducing inflammatory rumors and tensions" to the list. In October 1999, OTI/Indonesia also helped initiate a country program in East Timor in the aftermath of the devastation following its August 30th referendum for independence.

As noted, on one hand OTI's planning approach permitted a quick and flexible response to the changing situation, moving from elections support, to postelections issues, and finally to emerging conflicts in the outer islands. It also allowed for experimentation with new initiatives such as improving civilian-military relations.

On the other hand, the approach led to the proliferation of objectives, suggesting the need for a complex performance monitoring system. For example, several objectives (or results)—especially those for elections, civil society, and parliamentary support—were also targeted by the DG program. OTI financed a March 1999 assessment to gather impact information on election, media, and civil society support for OTI's annual results report, but relied heavily on information collected jointly by OTI and the DG office through impact surveys of voter campaigns. This raises the question of whether OTI's monitoring of overlapping objectives is necessary or efficient. Monitoring at the activity and output level may be sufficient for many of the small activities initiated. However, where OTI and DG programs have been integrated in the strategic plan or overlap, joint monitoring can achieve efficiencies and provide a better overall picture of USAID impact. Unfortunately, most monitoring was conducted separately.

The OTI program became better integrated in the FY 2000 country strategic plan,[8] facilitated by mission leadership and approved in Washington in June 2000. OTI activities supported the two following broad strategic objectives (SOs):

- *SO 7*: "democratic reforms sustained and deepened," included some OTI activities (such as media), some of which the mission is continuing through longer term, followon grants with OTI partners.

- *SO 9*: "impact of conflicts and crises reduced," included the bulk of OTI activities.

The FY 2000 plan better focused OTI efforts (media, civil society, and local institution-strengthening activities) within the objective of reduced conflict in restive areas (so-called "hot spots"). In addition, the programs became more complementary as OTI moved to phase out areas of overlap (such as parliamentarian training). The conflict focus was especially appropriate to OTI's mandate and comparative strength in responding quickly to crisis situations with short-term responses.

Smaller areas of collaboration and shared financing involved other objectives, as follows:

- *SO 8*: "health of women and children improved"
- *SO 10*: "decentralized and participatory local government"

---

[7] Ibid.
[8] USAID/Indonesia, Transition to a Prospering and Democratic Indonesia: Country Strategy Paper, May 30, 2000.

- *SO 11*: "foundations set for rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth"
- *SO 12*: "decentralized and strengthened natural resources management"

Under SO 8, for example, such collaboration included OTI's support for conflict mitigation within a cross-SO task force for conflict-prone Aceh, while the mission's SO 8 team provided health assistance to conflict victims.

Concentrating the OTI program on broader objectives within the country plan helped focus it and helped USAID capture the impact of OTI's effort within the combined program. Integration also facilitated handoff in areas such as civil society, media, and civilian-military relations, areas that require continuation for maximum sector impact and sustainability. However, OTI's continued separate planning and results monitoring worked against full integration.

Through its document reviews and interviews, the evaluators found that OTI and DG staff had not fully understood each other's roles and planning processes. This complicated integration of the OTI program into the country plan. The DG staff initially saw OTI's role as providing additional resources, including staff, to help the mission (more specifically, the DG staff) address the political transition. DG staff also anticipated working as one team under one objective and one authority. They placed a high priority on strategic planning directed to specific results. On the other hand, OTI staff were much less familiar with, or did not see the need for, strategic planning, and gave priority to taking action. They understood less well, or perhaps did not value, the potential advantages of greater integration of the two programs in demonstrating USAID assistance within the country context, increasing the efficiency of impact monitoring, and facilitating handoff. As understanding of each other's roles increased, DG and OTI programs became better integrated, and USAID's decisions were better able to take into account the tradeoffs between short-term transition assistance and long-term development assistance within the country context.

In summary, the decision for a broader OTI role than recommended by the mission set the stage for rivalry, lack of understanding, and lack of ownership of the OTI program by DG staff. It also led to program overlap.

OTI's approach to planning permitted experimentation and a quick and flexible shift of emphasis from elections to postelections issues and finally to emerging conflict in the outer island regions. But the approach also led to the proliferation of OTI program objectives and dual monitoring systems.

The OTI program became more focused on broader objectives within the country plan. Fuller integration of planning and impact monitoring helped realize some efficiencies, maximize USAID's ability to capture the impact of OTI efforts within the combined program, and facilitate the handoff of OTI initiatives to other mission programs. But OTI's continued separate planning and monitoring worked against full integration.

The lack of understanding by OTI and DG staff of each other's roles and planning processes complicated early efforts to integrate the OTI program with the country plan. Better understanding has been important to improving program integration and informing USAID

decisions on the tradeoffs between short- and long-term assistance within the country context.

How was transition assistance implemented in Indonesia? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the approach?

In July 1998, the U.S. ambassador requested OTI international disaster assistance funding of more than $3 million for elections support, independent media strengthening, and multisectarian efforts to increase ethnic and religious group cooperation.[9] OTI proceeded quickly with implementation, signing cooperative agreements with three implementing NGOs that month and launching its program the next. The three NGOs shortly thereafter signed a number of subgrants with local NGOs.

To manage the program OTI placed a country director in Jakarta under the authority of OTI/Washington. Washington staff on temporary duty directed the program from August 1998 until about October of that year, when a U.S. personal services contractor arrived to fill the post. OTI also set up two regional offices—one in Medan (February 1999) to administer activities west of the island of Java, and the other in Surabaya (February 1999) to manage activities in East Java and points east. The Jakarta office was overseeing these regional offices and one in East Timor (January 2000).

Implementing Mechanisms and Procedures

From July 1998 until July 1999 the three initial implementing NGOs (two U.S. and one Indonesian) provided subgrants to local organizations working toward a peaceful transition to democracy. Meanwhile, in October 1998 OTI/Indonesia began shifting program implementation to the new OTI-managed SWIFT contract. The Washington office had recently set up the SWIFT indefinite quantity contract to provide a worldwide capability to respond quickly to transitions; Indonesia was its first effort.

In late 1998 the SWIFT contractor, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), conducted several assessments. By September 2000 the Jakarta DAI office had 16 staff. Regional offices established in Surabaya and Medan had 14 staff each. A small two-person office was later established in Aceh (May 2000), reporting to the Medan office. The SWIFT contract provided procurement and implementation services, including staff and administration for regional offices, and small, mainly in-kind, grants to Indonesian organizations. Partial cash grants were provided in Jakarta on an exceptional basis and somewhat more often elsewhere (an estimated 30–40 percent of each grant in Surabaya) as program responsibilities were shifted from East Java to more distant, outer island "hot spots."

SWIFT and OTI staff had distinct roles and responsibilities. OTI program staff selected grantees and conduct program assessments, while SWIFT handled implementation and related logistics monitoring. An early lesson learned, however, was the need for SWIFT to participate in program discussions to address potential budget issues. The OTI country

[9] U.S. embassy Jakarta cable, Request for Additional Assistance, July 9, 1998.

director approved all grants (including those for East Timor) up to $100,000, but implementation responsibility rested largely with regional offices.[10] The SWIFT contractor was co-located with OTI program staff in regional offices but separately in Jakarta. The regional offices enabled OTI to extend its reach to grassroots organizations in secondary urban areas and regions outside the main island of Java. The systematic steps and roles of OTI and SWIFT are summarized below (with the exception of Surabaya):

Steps	Principal Actor
Receive proposal	OTI
Make first cut: consideration or rejection	OTI
Enter data and distribute comments	OTI
Review and assist in modifying proposals	OTI
Prepare political transition grant (PTG) proposal	OTI
Approve PTG (OTI/Jakarta team leader)	OTI
Send approved PTG to SWIFT contractor	OTI
Prepare and finalize memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Indonesian organization	SWIFT
Implement and report on MOU activity	SWIFT
Monitor implementation/program	SWIFT/OTI
Close-out MOU/evaluate activity	SWIFT/OTI

OTI identified proposals that supported the political transition and mitigated conflict. Factors reviewed by OTI included the proposed outputs, impact, budget, planned contribution by the organization, and other funding support. OTI also considered whether the activity was nonpartisan and attended to other aspects such as gender, followup planning, and the potential for the media to broaden the results.

The bulk of the OTI program was management intensive, involving very small, short-term, and often one-off grants to local organizations, many of which had limited capacity to prepare and execute proposals. According to OTI staff, the average grant was the local currency equivalent of $5,000 to $50,000. These amounts were small compared to most USAID-funded development activities. In all but two cases, grant duration averaged less than one month. OTI's turnaround time from proposal receipt to grant completion was quick, ranging from one to five weeks. Through early September 2000, SWIFT processed 346 grants worth $10.6 million, plus approximately $5 million in operational costs.

Interviews with OTI, SWIFT, donor and NGO partners, embassy staff, and 12 local grantees in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya identified several advantages and disadvantages of the SWIFT mechanism. On the positive side, the mechanism clearly permitted OTI to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging opportunities and fund a variety of short-term activities initiated by small or newly emerging local organizations with limited institutional capacity. It was an appropriate mechanism for financing activities quickly in a transition. It also provided opportunities to work with NGO partners directly rather than through bureaucratic, risk-averse government departments. By providing assistance in kind, SWIFT

[10]OTI/Washington approves grants over $100,000.

eliminated the time-consuming tasks of assessing, developing, and monitoring financial management and procurement by local organizations, thus allowing OTI to focus on the specific activity rather than capacity building. SWIFT is a mechanism that other USAID entities can use for transition activities, though few USAID missions are aware of its availability for non-OTI activities.

While recognizing the advantages of in-kind assistance, local grantees also raised concerns. For example, they questioned the so-called "lack of trust," the "lost opportunity" to cover overhead and build capacity, and the inability to "control" or ensure procurement quality.[11] Several suggested that the system could be improved by providing a combination of in-kind and cash assistance, for instance, for large purchases and cash reimbursement for small items such as stationery and snacks. Another suggestion was for SWIFT to identify or otherwise include the grantee (for instance as the ultimate client/beneficiary) in its "agreement" with the vendor.

OTI regularly monitored grant activities. The Surabaya office monitored less frequently, an estimated 65 percent of activities (compared with 85 percent monitored elsewhere during the pre-election period), because of the increased number of activities in the outer islands. A 0–5 scale assessed internally each completed activity on four dimensions: its *provocativeness* (extent of the effect of an activity to encourage people to see issues in new ways); the *number of people and target population reached* (with emphasis on the spread effect); *timing of the activity* (to maximize political change); and *results* (followon actions, policies, or activities). While subjective, assessment of these short-term, often risky activities increased opportunities for learning what works and what does not.[12]

OTI developed a detailed database on its grants, enabling it to provide information to concerned USAID and embassy officers. Several mission and embassy staff found OTI information timely and useful for identifying contacts in outer island areas and making decisions in volatile crisis situations. Other OTI country field offices are adopting the database format. In July 1999, OTI developed a CD-ROM on the Indonesia program that has been used for training and information purposes.

Coordinating the OTI and Sustainable Development Programs

Interviews with OTI, other mission staff, embassy officers, other donors, and partners identified many examples of effective coordination with OTI. However, the respective roles of OTI and the mission DG team confused some people. Some spoke of USAID and OTI as if they were separate organizations. The confusion about roles focused particularly on the initial year, during which both teams implemented several similar election support activities (voter education, particularly in Jakarta, and public service announcements [PSAs]) and used

[11] In two instances cited, vendors had been confused about the mechanism: one vendor refused new services to the NGO when the SWIFT contractor, not the NGO, had not yet made payment; another noted the political sensitivity of SWIFT's presence in unstable geographic areas that associated the group with the U.S. Government. Another grantee indicated the inconsistency of the approach with cultural practice such as when the SWIFT contractor provided snacks rather than cash for a grassroots organization meeting.

[12] The monitoring system provides data on the individual events or activities and their implementation but is less helpful in monitoring the expected impact or achievement of objectives across activities.

the same implementing NGOs. While some PSA work was undertaken jointly and successfully, the level of coordination and program integration was less than one would expect given the shared objective.

The CDIE evaluators found that coordination and program integration improved over time. The DG staff expanded its capacity-building activities for the growing civil society sector and began providing longer term grants to OTI-identified NGOs. Another example of complementary efforts involved training for parliamentarians. OTI moved its focus to district-level training while the DG staff emphasized training at the national and provincial levels. OTI also developed a number of valuable local leader and NGO contacts through its Surabaya office that the new DG staff leader expected to use.

To a lesser degree, OTI programs complemented other mission programs. The Economic Growth (EG) team and OTI share a common interest in decentralization and increased public policy discussions. OTI offered assistance to the EG team to review revenue issues of two districts associated with decentralization. It also helped develop parliamentarians' understanding of economic issues, thus complementing the EG team's capacity-building efforts. There is potential for collaboration with EG on media programs on the economic aspects of the upcoming national decentralization reform, which would complement EG regional university-strengthening efforts.

The initiation of informal teams that work across strategic objectives contributed to better coordination of OTI and mission efforts in conflict-prone areas. For example, OTI played a major role in Aceh, working closely with health, food for peace, decentralization, and embassy officers to help mitigate the conflict and address basic needs. In another instance, OTI identified contacts for USAID's Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to help with internally displaced persons in North Sulawesi. Implementing NGOs picked up OTI's suggestion to use food aid in encouraging reconciliation among different religious groups. OTI also offered bridge funding to a local government association group in cooperation with the USAID decentralization and local government team.

Most mission staff clearly recognized the greater flexibility and quicker response time of OTI efforts compared to the procurement and implementation of many longer term, institutional development activities. Yet workload demands sometimes limited the extent to which mission staff could collaborate with OTI. As one put it, "the mission does not have the capacity to use OTI as well as it might." Others noted that OTI, for its part, needed to give more attention to coordination to maximize opportunities for collaboration and facilitate handoff.

OTI also worked closely with the embassy, particularly in conflict-prone areas, where both gave priority to short-term objectives and quick action. The ambassador and other embassy staff praised OTI's efforts, particularly its work in Aceh and East Timor.

Coordination between OTI and other mission staff improved, although some lack of understanding or appreciation of each other's roles remained. Early program decisions, already discussed, complicated cooperation. The congressional earmark of $15 million of FY 1999 development assistance (DA) funds for OTI implementation likely reinforced OTI and DG staff rivalry. Individual OTI and DG management styles also played a role. In addition,

differences in the cultures and authority relationships of OTI and longer term sustainable development programs made cooperation more difficult. These included differences in time orientation (rapid, short-term aims versus longer term goals), approach (action and risk-taking versus the more deliberate, methodical approach characterizing complex institutional development efforts), staff (consultants with experience in short-term relief and transition programs versus career employees or contractors with long-term development experience and skills), and bureau authority relationship (OTI is under the authority of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, while other mission staff work under the mission director, who is delegated authority from the Bureau for Asia and the Near East).

Better coordination of the two programs has been challenging to achieve. Nonetheless, in a shaky political environment such as Indonesia, USAID needed a mix of approaches and skills to respond to conflict while maintaining the momentum of the long-term development program. Indonesia's crises provided opportunities to constructively maximize the integration of relief and transition and development assistance.

Program Operations

Mission management strongly supported the integration of the OTI team into the mission administrative services structure. Accordingly, the USAID/Indonesia office in Jakarta provided administrative services for OTI, such as office space, furniture, contracting of U.S. personal service contractors, leasing and maintenance of housing, motor pool and drivers, local staff hiring, program support procurement, and security. OTI contributed an additional vehicle and one driver's salary to the mission pool. It also provided funding to rehabilitate a U.S.-owned building for its offices in Surabaya. The mission charged a portion of USAID's interagency costs to OTI for services covered. USAID/Washington provided contracting services for OTI that helped accelerate procurement. The integration of the mission operations worked well.

In summary, OTI initiated the transition program in Indonesia quickly, putting in place implementing mechanisms within two months. Its establishment of regional offices facilitated broad geographical coverage and the identification of local contacts and organizations.

OTI activities were more management intensive than are other USAID programs. But with the SWIFT contracting mechanism, OTI was able to effectively and quickly implement numerous, very small activities with emerging local organizations. However, the approach did not permit these organizations to develop institutional capacity in areas such as financial management and procurement.

Coordination of the OTI and DG programs got off to a bumpy start but improved with the clearer distinction of roles and program responsibilities. Constituting informal teams that worked across strategic objectives in conflict-prone regions facilitated program coordination. Crisis-prone Indonesia provided opportunities to constructively maximize the integration of relief and transition and development assistance. The integration of OTI into mission administrative services worked well.

Was the duration of the transition program appropriate? Were transition activities being handed off effectively to other mission or donor development programs?

OTI provides postemergency response programs during the two-year critical period when countries are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability.[13] But exiting these programs can be complicated.[14] This was especially true in Indonesia, where crises continued to emerge, U.S. entities strongly supported a continued OTI presence, and transition initiatives required continuity to realize long-term impact. Indonesia illustrates the dilemma OTI faces in transition situations that require conflict-mitigation capacity over a longer term.

Initially, OTI was scheduled to phase out in September 2000, expecting to hand off "key transitional challenges" to other mission offices.[15] But neither OTI nor mission leadership dealt systematically with the issue of handoff during the initial assessment and the implementation period. By May 2000 the planned exit date had shifted to June 2001.[16] In late 1999 the mission initiated the development of a long-term strategic plan, and mission leadership encouraged teams to work with OTI to identify appropriate handoff candidates. The new plan spelled out the intent that activities be handed off by September 2001,[17] approximately three years after program initiation. The mission agreed to submit a handoff strategy to Washington by September 2000 to ensure that appropriate elements such as civilian-military relations, independent media, and regional parliament development will be continued under the mission's strategic plan.[18] In addition, the mission was to plan how to maintain a rapid response capability.

The issue of phaseout sparked considerable discussion within and outside OTI. Some, even in OTI, called for phaseout after the elections and the handing off of appropriate and continuing civilian-military, civil society, and conflict mitigation efforts to other offices at that time. Some questioned whether the Indonesia case met the rationale for OTI assistance once elections were over, particularly when mission DG staff were focusing on the democracy-building effort in many of the same areas as OTI. Others argued for a continued OTI role. Postponement of planning for turnover of media strengthening, civilian-military, and regional parliament development beyond the initial period prolonged OTI's management of these activities.

---

[13] USAID, OTI 1999-2000 Report, 4. OTI's statement of an expected time period for country programs reflects a more recent policy. Initially, transition assistance was expected to last a shorter time, about six months. The average actual duration of all programs to date is more than three years.
[14] OTI, Results Review FY 1999, 10.
[15] OTI, Results Review FY 1998 and Resource Request FY 2001, June 1999, 30.
[16] OTI, Results Review FY 1999, Annex B.
[17] USAID/Indonesia, May 30, 2000, 45: "In light of the fact that OTI may phase out of Indonesia by the end of FY 2001, the Democracy Team and OTI have already begun to identify and transfer OTI grantees and activities that have potential for sustainable development partnering to the Mission's Democracy Team. Internews is an example of one former OTI grantee that will be fully funded and managed by the Democracy Team in FY 00."
[18] As of March 2001, the evaluators were not aware of any plan submission.

The decision to extend OTI's presence beyond September 2000 was based on a mix of factors, including the then-upcoming November 1999 presidential election by the parliament, the promotion of an accelerated government decentralization process without adequate information and capacity in place, the increasing sectarian and political conflict emerging across the archipelago (including that in East Timor), and the high priority of Indonesia to U.S. national interests. Both mission and embassy leadership called for a continued OTI presence. The FY 2001 appropriations bill for USAID assistance also specified a role for OTI in implementing the $5 million in economic support funds earmarked for economic rehabilitation and related activities in Aceh, a continuing hot spot where OTI played a lead role.

OTI/Indonesia routinely identified potential grantees and activities for the mission to consider for long-term support. It also planned to conduct a beneficiary analysis in November 2000 as part of its exit planning. The CDIE evaluators found numerous instances of planning for handoff in the areas of governance, conflict management, decentralization, civic education, and media. In addition, the DG team leader had begun interviewing OTI grantees in Surabaya and expected to provide grants to three or four of the nine interviewed. An issue faced by the DG team was whether to maintain the OTI regional office in Surabaya and how to do so efficiently when OTI and DG had separate contracts in place for civil society support. OTI staff indicated that they expected to identify 25–30 percent of their local NGO partners as potential candidates for longer term DG grants.

Some handoff activities were foreseen as part of specific activities, such as bridge funding for programs until longer term funding mechanisms could take over. For example, OTI funded an expatriate advisor for eight months for the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation until both Canada and USAID could develop long-term grants. The assistance enabled the advisor to initiate work promptly, including establishing and equipping an office, hiring staff, and conducting a needs assessment throughout Indonesia. OTI continued to fund occasional short-term activities for the Legal Aid Foundation, including assisting with expensive travel costs to Jakarta for outer-island Indonesians to participate in foundation-conducted training. Another bridge activity supported human rights activities in Papua, where OTI funded a start-up grant while the DG office negotiated a longer term grant.

Once initiated, handoff proceeded systematically. The case for extending OTI's stay fit its mandate to help USAID/Indonesia respond quickly to actual and potential sectarian and ethnic conflict. But there were alternatives to OTI's continued presence; for example, the SWIFT mechanism was available for use by non-OTI entities for such transitions. Some activities OTI supported during the postelection period—decentralization and capacity building for local parliamentarians, media strengthening, and civilian-military relations—are part of the longer term DG or other USAID institution-building efforts. Earlier attention to issues of handoff by the USAID mission when planning and initiating these activities would likely have facilitated earlier phasedown or phaseout.

The absence of a clear and consistently applied Agency policy on duration and phaseout contributed to slower handoff in Indonesia. It is not clear under what conditions transition assistance should be extended, phased out, or alternatively phased down. While the absence of a clear policy provided USAID maximum flexibility in decisionmaking, it also led to confusion and uncertainty about OTI's role and contributed to the postponement of

decisions by the mission (and the regional bureau) on both handoff and the identification of alternatives for addressing extended conflict. Moreover, in Indonesia, longer term approaches beyond OTI's mandate and capacity will be needed to address the fundamental issues of conflict.

In summary, exiting from Indonesia was complicated, although once initiated the handoff proceeded systematically. Some handoff activities were routine. For example, OTI regularly identified potential grantees for consideration for longer term support, and some handoff was part of short-term bridging activities.

The issue of duration sparked considerable discussion within and outside OTI. The phaseout date continued to shift, eventually slipping from one to three years. Some contributing factors include: 1) USAID did not consider duration during early engagement stages, 2) the ongoing sectarian and political conflict across the archipelago (including East Timor), and 3) the high priority of Indonesia to U.S. national interests. Another important factor was the absence of a clear and consistently applied Agency policy on duration and phaseout. While the absence of a clear policy provided USAID maximum flexibility in decisionmaking, it also led to confusion and uncertainty about OTI's role and contributed to the postponement of decisions by the mission (and the regional bureau) on both handoff and the identification of alternatives for addressing extended conflict. Moreover, in Indonesia, longer term approaches beyond OTI's mandate and capacity will be needed to address the fundamental issues of conflict.

Were transition activities achieving their objectives effectively?

OTI's mission in Indonesia was to program flexible, short-term, high-impact assistance to help local partners advance peaceful, democratic change in a conflict-prone environment. The CDIE evaluators looked at the role of transition assistance generally as well as individual program areas, addressing effectiveness, relevance, and impact within the limits of available data and time constraints. Findings are based on a review of principal program documents; interviews with USAID staff, partners, and beneficiaries; existing assessments; and other relevant information.

The number of grants programmed and funded for FY 1999 and FY 2000 are summarized in Table 2 below. Nearly all grants are "political transition grants," which OTI develops with partners to provide small amounts of money quickly to support good, local ideas that advance transition.

Table 2. OTI-Funded Grants
(Values in million dollars)

	FY 99*		FY 00**		Totals	
Activity	Grants	Value	Grants	Value	Grants	Value
Elections support	83	$2.4	0	$0	83	$2.4
Media strengthening	71	5.9	24	0.7	95	6.6
Civil society support	105	2.6	78	2.1	183	4.7
Civil-military relations	10	0.3	23	0.9	33	1.2
Governance	17	0.3	40	1.2	57	1.5
Totals:	286	$11.5	165	$4.9	451	$16.4

Source: * OTI/Jakarta Bi-Weekly Report, 8/18/00
** OTI/Jakarta Bi-Weekly Report, 8/16/00

Over the two-year period, media strengthening received 40 percent of the assistance; civil society support, 29 percent; elections support, 15 percent; governance, 9 percent; and civilian-military relations, 7 percent. The bulk of FY 1999 funding (95 percent) was for media strengthening, civil society support, and elections. Much of the media strengthening and civil society support for FY 1999 directly supported elections. The civilian-military relations and governance programs received increased attention in FY 2000. Approximately 70 percent[19] of the FY 2000 funding was for conflict resolution, mitigation, or prevention in hot-spot regions, cutting across the program categories. Civil society support involved the most intensive use of small grants (41 percent of the 451 grants), while much of the media-strengthening effort was implemented through a larger grant to Internews.

General Responsiveness

OTI/Indonesia received widespread praise for its ability to respond quickly and appropriately. The insertion of additional transition resources, both funding and staff, in June 1998 helped USAID jumpstart its response to a rapidly changing political environment. In that first year OTI demonstrated a quick-response capability to a number of crises, often responding much faster than other donors. Interviews with USAID, embassy, donor, and implementing partners highlighted OTI's capacity to recognize opportunities, develop a relevant set of activities, and implement them promptly. Many singled out the SWIFT mechanism as a contributor to this responsiveness. Others pointed to the contribution of OTI's regional offices, which facilitated the development of important local NGO and other contacts over an extensive geographic area. The embassy and other USAID teams benefited from these contacts as they expanded their own programs to the outer islands, especially in those areas beset by political instability and/or intermittent conflict.

While recognizing these strengths, some noted the limitations of the short-term, rapid response approach. Short-term transition assistance supported actions that helped quell or partially address an immediate crisis, but it was not considered a panacea for dealing with fundamental, deeply rooted political issues that required a broad and sustained effort to

[19] USAID/Indonesia, Country Strategy Paper, 40.

address. The optimum seemed to be a combination of short- and long-term approaches, particularly during periods of intermittent conflict. Finally, the rapid response approach came with risk. There can be unintended consequences when moving quickly; for instance, when an emerging organization promotes controversial ideas or activities that are inconsistent with U.S. policy.

Multifaceted Support for Elections—FY 1999 Program

The bulk of the FY 1999 OTI program directly or indirectly contributed to Indonesia's ability to hold free and fair national elections in June 1999. OTI and DG programs together contributed to this success, with OTI using a variety of voter education, media-strengthening, and civil society mobilization efforts.[20] An important initiative was helping to establish and assist new NGO Visi Anak Bangsa, which developed a series of PSAs for television and radio, held public dialogues or town meetings, and conducted public-opinion polling before and after PSAs aired.

A March 2000 assessment of the impact of OTI election activities—voter education through PSAs and workshops/training sessions plus training for journalists on elections—found that "the multi-faceted voter and civic education campaign of FY 1999 reached a high percentage of the Indonesian population with its messages of participation and democracy."[21] Specifically, the assessment indicated that the voter education campaign increased people's confidence in the purpose of the election and encouraged the electorate, especially women, to vote according to personal beliefs. The voter education campaigns using PSAs reached 140–180 million television viewers. In addition, the tabloids and print PSAs reached 23 million people. Journalistic and media producer skills for election reporting and program production were also upgraded. Finally, a local polling center developed the capacity to provide information on voting patterns nationwide.

Because of the coverage of elections support by the March assessment, the CDIE evaluators did not look at this area intensively. Nonetheless, they confirmed the important role OTI assistance played in supporting the elections in general and in airing political and election issues through the media in particular. The voter education surveys initiated by OTI became the building block for USAID surveys during the elections. A number of grantees confirmed the importance of the OTI assistance in helping them to inform voters, especially women, about election processes and issues through television or radio talk shows and community focus group discussions. The grantees built on these earlier experiences to launch postelection activities on governance and regional autonomy issues with OTI or other funding.

Media Strengthening

The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 ushered in press freedom and a burst of news media activity. Recognizing the window of opportunity and building on its experience

[20] OTI, Results Review FY 1999, 5.

[21] Elizabeth Osborn, Impact Assessment of OTI/Indonesia FY 1999 Program, April 10, 2000, 16. This assessment also noted that of voter education surveys undertaken, an OTI-sponsored PSA was found to be the most memorable and meaningful form of voter education available.

in the Balkans and elsewhere, OTI launched a major media-strengthening effort in 1998. This initiative not only enhanced the political dialogue during the elections and postelection period, but also resulted in important media law changes. With approximately $2.9 million in OTI assistance, Internews, a U.S. private voluntary organization (PVO), provided managerial and technical training for journalists and producers, equipment for 50 radio stations, model radio programs for producers, and technical assistance to the national parliament for media law development. The objective was to enable OTI-supported NGOs and the media to better articulate messages in policymaking arenas. Another objective was to help NGOs increase the impact of their activities by effective use of media.

The March 2000 assessment found that journalists and producers reported upgraded skills as the most important result of the OTI-financed training.[22] Another contribution was the development of news programs for radio and the proliferation of print and television media. And the Internews-funded technical expert helped draft a print press law that was passed in late 1998. This law facilitated the establishment of more than 200 new publications. Broadcast laws were also modified with OTI-funded assistance, easing the approval of five new television stations.

Examples of the positive impact of the OTI-funded media-strengthening effort include the following:

- *Media law development.* Internews assisted the parliament in drawing up an electronic media law and code of ethics.[23]

- *Radio productions on important political issues.* An Indonesian NGO (Policy Center) produced a two-hour weekly interactive radio law show called *Ombudsperson.* The program covered topics on government policy on media and on parliament, playing a role in informing the public on reforms and other-country experience with such reforms.[24]

- *Effective investigative reporting/adaptation of story ideas.* Radio station producers took a sensitive human trafficking story idea developed by a grantee for Indonesia, incorporated local reporting on the issue, and successfully produced locally relevant radio programs.[25]

- *Strengthened capacity for radio shows on gender issues.* Grantee Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan (Foundation for the Women's Journal), with assistance from Internews, launched the country's first gender-based radio program and is now producing programs on its own.[26]

- *Monitoring media performance.* Grantee Media Consumer, a media watch NGO, conducted radio talk shows and provided input on media law and ethics issues to national and local parliaments six times.[27]

---

[22] Elizabeth Osborn, 13.
[23] Source: Internews.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Media Consumer.

- *Use of multiple media to extend coverage/impact.* Interviews with grantees indicate successful use of media to increase outreach. All use more than one type of media to communicate their messages. This may include traditional media (radio, television, and print), alternative media (bumper stickers and posters), and drama (puppet shows). OTI regularly encourages NGOs to strengthen their activity proposals with multiple media and plans to develop a media handbook and training guide for NGOs to enhance their advocacy efforts.[28]

- *Strengthening local capacity through journalist training and campaigns.* The Southeast Asian Press Alliance, with initial funding from OTI, reached numerous journalists who write about political issues and helped inform the public about media laws.[29]

The media-strengthening initiative was timely and effective; it was probably the most visible and widely recognized OTI effort. It served not only the short-term objective of informing the public on political issues during the election and postelection periods, but also the longer term objective of institutional development through capacity building and legal framework development. In fact, the combined effort provided a stronger base for sustainability. The DG staff will continue the institutional development effort through its own grant with Internews as the OTI grant ends. Future plans included continued support to the radio industry network; development of informational programming on new topics for the radio network; coverage of political, environment, and gender issues; institutionalization of an Indonesia media policy and law center; and possible training-of-trainers activities with a university.[30]

Civil Society Support

The civil society support effort sought to enable NGOs to articulate messages in policy settings. Through small, usually very short-term grants, OTI provided substantial support for NGO efforts to inform the public on political issues and advocate reforms. This activity overlapped elections support during the first year. In the postelection period, topics included decentralization/regional autonomy, effectiveness of parliament, anticorruption, human rights (including gender), economic reform, environmental pollution, and other emerging political issues.

Interviews with 12 Indonesian grantees and three U.S. organizations provided anecdotal information on activities that were effectively informing the public on political issues and advocating reforms. Some activities had national impact. The small, selected number of NGOs interviewed, the lack of impact data to assess advocacy effectiveness across individual grants, and the variety of issues addressed made it difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of these activities.[31] However, it was clear that OTI grants permitted numerous small and emerging NGOs to carry out short-term activities, some of which had broader impact. While

[28] Source: Grantees. Several indicated increased understanding of the effectiveness of some types of media over others, depending upon geographical location and type of activity.
[29] OTI, Media Update, August 2000.
[30] Source, Internews.
[31] Elizabeth Osborn, 14–16, found that these programs in FY 1999 had positive impacts at the activity level but could not fully evaluate the collective impact because the activities reviewed did not have many commonalities.

transition assistance did not emphasize capacity building, the grantees could identify capacity improvements such as more effective use of media techniques and better understanding of what media to use for different audiences. Illustrative postelection grant activities and their contributions include the following:

- *Greater awareness of good governance.* Grantee Association of Study and Development for a People's Economy (PKPEK) conducted an anticorruption campaign on public/private resources through media interactive shows. Ten radio stations relayed the campaign. A postcampaign poll indicated that the public, especially students, had a better understanding of government malpractices. Results were reported in newspapers and 10,000 tabloids.[32]

- *Influencing legislation.* Grantee Brawijaya Law Faculty conducted an opinion survey in 16 provinces on the presidential proposal to revoke the ban on the Communist Party. Results showed that 46 percent of the respondents did not agree with the revocation, 29 percent indicated the law needed analysis, and 14 percent recommended that parliament discuss the law. Subsequent interactive radio and focus group discussions suggested that researchers look more closely at the perceptions of students (who generally disagreed with revocation), NGOs (who generally agreed), and the role of the public in retaliating against suspected communists. The grantee presented its data to the parliament in Jakarta. Upon review, the deputy leader recommended that Indonesia clarify its national history, differentiate between peoples' political and legal rights, and undertake "post-traumatic treatment" for the nation to recover from its past.[33]

- *Influencing a constitutional amendment.* Koalisi Perempuan (Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy) successfully convinced the parliament to amend the 1945 constitution by inserting a chapter on human and children rights that included principles of the UN Convention on Women and Children. The Minister of Women's Empowerment ratified the amendment in 1999. The NGO had involved several stakeholders and the public in public dialogues, workshops, media announcements, and the formation of a women's caucus in the parliament.[34]

- *Informing the public of a regional issue.* Grantee Yayasan Tunas Bangsa held four radio talk shows and two public hearings on the advantages and disadvantages of electing a governor as opposed to retaining the traditional hereditary sultan in the Yogyakarta region. The public was actively engaged. The organization expected to follow this with an opinion poll on the importance of the elections and present the findings to the sultan.[35]

- *Advocating a clean environment at the local level.* Grantee Wahana Lingkungan Hidup in Surabaya, a network of 52 mainly environmental NGOs, developed an environmental plan and presented it to local parliaments in four cities. Results included successful

[32] Association of Study and Development for a People's Economy (PKPEK).
[33] Brawijaya Law Faculty and OTI/USAID, "Hot Topics," August 2, 2000.
[34] Koalisi Perempuan (Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy) and OTI/USAID, "Hot Topics," August 30, 2000.
[35] Yayasan Tunas Bangsa.

advocacy for environmental accountability, rejection of a nonlegitimate regency election, and empowering local groups to meet with government officials on their own.[36]

OTI recommended that USAID consider providing long-term grants to approximately 30 OTI grantees. DG, through its capacity-building contract, was moving to initiate grants to three organizations and was looking positively at others. One DG staff member characterized OTI's role in civil society as "planting a lot of seeds" from which leading NGOs emerge. USAID staff and partners noted that OTI successfully developed contacts with several dynamic leaders and groups, including women's organizations. These contacts were helping USAID teams and other donors identify partners in the regional hot spots off Java, thereby increasing the potential for longer term impact from the assistance.

In summary, assessing the overall impact of the civil society effort is difficult in the absence of a monitoring system that collects data on a shared result. Moreover, it may not be practical for OTI to try to monitor impact of these very small activities separately from the mission. Where data were available, DG staff had captured some impact of OTI civil society efforts in the 2000 country results report but with difficulty. Integrated monitoring of civil society efforts would help USAID better capture the overall impact of these results. Disseminating best practices to other NGOs is an important way to extend the impact of OTI efforts.

Conflict Mitigation, Resolution, and Prevention

With conflict mitigation, resolution, and prevention activities, OTI aimed to increase access to accurate objective information, thereby reducing inflammatory rumors and tensions. These efforts overlapped extensively with elections support, media-strengthening, and civil society efforts. Activities included support to NGOs for media assessments, information campaigns, polling surveys, interactive radio dialogues, and journalist training. In early 2000 OTI turned its attention to the conflict-prone regions off the central island of Java. Working on informal mission regional teams, OTI was actively monitoring or supporting activities in the regions of Aceh, Malulu, Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara (including West Timor), West Nusa Tenggara, West Papua, and Sumatra.

The evaluators were unable to assess the overall effectiveness of these efforts in view of the variety of mechanisms and approaches used, the absence of impact data, and the early stage of many of these efforts. However, anecdotal information indicated there was general agreement on OTI's comparative advantage in addressing crisis situations, including the capacity to assess needs rapidly, identify key regional contacts, and respond quickly with appropriate activities. For example, one implementing partner described OTI as a "swat team" that provided "flexible, timely, and critical support in addressing short-term crises." Illustrative examples of contributions identified include the following:

- *Addressing conflict through interfaith workshops and antiviolence campaigns in North Sumatra.* OTI's support to the Muslim Institute and Conference of Churches enabled these groups to conduct a large, aggressive antiviolence campaign and promote interfaith dialogue prior to the elections. The election period passed with almost no violence.

[36] Wahana Lingkungan Hidup.

These groups continue to hold regular exchanges to promote interfaith activities and initiatives.[37]

- *Initiating a quick response to East Timor's postreferendum conflict.* In the postconflict period, OTI provided the first support to NGOs and community-led reconstruction and employment activities. This helped stem further deterioration during a highly unstable postconflict period and enabled local groups to become engaged in decisions about the territory's future political organization and functions.[38]

- *Supporting the Humanitarian Pause in Aceh.* In May 2000 the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement reached a joint understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for the June–October 2000 period. In March 2000 OTI had provided technical support to the U.S. task force to identify opportunities for restoring security and economic development and in May 2000, OTI set up a small field office. With OTI funding, a local NGO conducted a mass media campaign to publicize the details of the agreement before it became effective. Other immediate support included office infrastructure, transportation, and communications training. There were plans to initiate a local infrastructure rehabilitation program. Anecdotal information suggested that the media effort helped calm political tensions. OTI's quick action enabled the action committees to initiate their critical post-Humanitarian Pause work.[39]

- *Assessing opportunities in Sulawesi.* OTI funding supported media assessments in Central and Northern Sulawesi and a joint OTI-DG-OFDA conflict prevention assessment. Initial followon grants were being initiated at the time of the evaluation, providing opportunities to address issues in these volatile areas quickly.[40]

Clearly USAID, with OTI help, was able to respond quickly, often more quickly than other donors, in these tense situations. Nevertheless, some indicated the need for a long-term mechanism to address conflict.[41] One option was for USAID/Indonesia to use the SWIFT contract to respond to short-term crises. In addition, a strategy to address more fundamental issues or causes of conflict will require an approach that went beyond OTI's short-term mandate and capacity.

Civilian-Military Relations

At USAID/Indonesia's request, OTI took the lead in addressing civilian-military relations. The expected impact was to decrease military involvement in civil and political affairs. OTI funded an initial assessment that recommended, among other activities, small efforts led by

[37] OTI, Results Review FY 1999, Indonesia country profile, Annex B.
[38] OTI's activities in East Timor are covered in a separate case study: Working Paper No. 322 (PN-ACN-764), also as Evaluation Highlights No. 77 (PN-ACN-765). This example is included as an important activity the USAID/OTI team undertook as part of the Indonesia program in 1999.
[39] OTI and NGO documents and interviews.
[40] Alliance of Independent Journalists and Internews Indonesia, "Crisis in Poso," June 28, 2000; OTI, Sulawesi Fact Sheet, September 2000; and interviews.
[41] The USAID/Indonesia Strategic Plan, 42, also identifies both short- and long-term conflict resolution assistance.

interested local citizens' groups. The decision was to support local groups in engaging their respective communities in promoting military reform. The grants targeted groups ranging from student and labor activists to academicians, especially outside the capital city where civilian oversight was more limited. Activities included tracking the military's human rights record in local areas, assessments of the military's role in political and social organizations, and public discussions on its future role under the draft security and defense law. OTI also provided an eight-month, $0.5-million grant to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a U.S. organization, to support capacity building and civilian-military dialogue.

OTI documents and interviews provided anecdotal information on the activities, although this review was too limited to assess overall impact. Clearly, the objective was quite ambitious given the small size and the large challenges of this program. As one partner pointed out, modifying the civilian-military relationship involved fundamental institutional change that would require a long time. Illustrative activities funded included the following:

- *Discussing a new role for the military.* With OTI funding, grantee PROPATRIA conducted a series of roundtable discussions on political issues with more than 100 participants. One of these involved public expectations of a reformed military role. Results were reported in various media and to parliament. The grantee had recently received another OTI grant for developing a civilian blueprint for military reform and its presentation to political decisionmakers.[42]

- *Helping strengthen the legislative role.* NDI held an introductory workshop on legislative oversight for the parliamentary committee responsible for military oversight. NDI was negotiating a grant with an Indonesian NGO to provide drafting expertise. NDI will also provide comparative information on laws of other countries to inform the process. While the legislative effort has moved slowly, it is expected to be an important factor in helping institutionalize the civilian oversight role.[43]

- *Improving journalistic skills in reporting on the civilian-military role.* NDI conducted a series of workshops for journalists to improve investigative reporting skills. It also funded visits to the Philippines and Thailand for journalists to increase their knowledge of the role of the military in other countries.

- *Strengthening university education and research.* NDI has been exploring opportunities to help two universities revise existing master's degree programs on security to reflect a new role for the military.

The civilian-military relationship must change if Indonesia is to achieve full democratic rule. The civilian-military relationship is a relatively new area for USAID, and the Agency's involvement is legally restricted. OTI provided an advisor to work with the Washington DG Center to strengthen capacity in this area. In Indonesia, the approach was to combine short-

[42] PROPATRIA.
[43] Brian King of NDI is the source of information on NDI efforts.

term civil society activities with capacity- and institution-building efforts. A longer term effort, beyond OTI's mandate, would be needed to realize sustainable results.

Governance

In FY 2000 OTI expanded its support to NGOs for governance activities such as decentralization and autonomy, training for local parliamentarians, and parliament watch. The objectives were to increase local parliamentarians' capacity to manage local resources under decentralization.

The CDIE evaluators reviewed documents and interviewed a few NGOs that were implementing governance programs. This review was not sufficient to assess these efforts but provided anecdotal information on specific activities as follows:

- *Training on regional autonomy issues.* Grantee Yayasan Cakrawala Timur conducted training on regional autonomy issues for selected groups, including East Java parliamentarians. Followon surveys showed that understanding of the issues improved. Previously this grantee held workshops in 13 districts for grassroots organizations to help build advocacy skills. These latter workshops reached more than 350 people directly.[44]

- *Raising awareness of autonomy issues.* Grantee Baha Eti Foundation sponsored a series of activities to encourage local participation in political decisionmaking at the regional level. Followon newspaper reports revealed public dissatisfaction with their local parliamentarians' understanding of local issues. Local parliamentarians criticized the group for "interfering." However, in the end, the grantee offered to conduct an interactive dialogue between parliamentarians and the local organization to discuss issues.[45]

Cross-cutting Theme: Gender

OTI actively supported the inclusion of women's participation in all grants and funded numerous grants addressing women's rights issues. The objective was to increase women's participation in local and national politics. More than 50 grants helped local organizations encourage women's participation in Indonesia's political transition.

The CDIE evaluators met with several OTI-supported Indonesian NGOs focusing on gender issues. Given the cross-cutting nature of this effort and the lack of data, it is not possible to assess the overall impact of this approach. However, it is clear that the focus on gender and the multiple efforts contributed to many successful activities that increased political awareness among the public or otherwise successfully promoted women's issues. Two important examples are the successful campaign to amend the constitution to include a passage on women's and children's rights and the women's radio programs on women's issues. Others include:

[44] Yayasan Cakrawala Timur.
[45] Baha Eti Foundation.

- *Broadening participation.* With OTI funding, grantee Yayasan Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil (YASPPUK) used media campaigns and grassroots discussions to initiate voter education programs for women in 5 regions and 24 provinces. The grantee indicated these efforts led to increased participation by women. A postelection grant supported grassroots discussions that provided civic education and advocated for government support for women's programs, including microbusiness.[46]

- *Addressing women's issues.* With OTI funds, grantee PLIP-Mitra Wacan, a coalition of 13 NGOs, conducted 6 interactive radio talk shows to identify women's rights issues, such as domestic violence and labor issues. The organization also developed 12 additional radio programs on women's issues, eventually airing them on 10 radio stations covering much of Central Java. Two radio talks were also held on the draft emergency law, with 30 percent women's participation. A third grant financed civic education for women.[47]

Following Up on OTI Initiatives

An important role of transition assistance is to serve as a bridge between the end of conflict and conflict relief and the long-term sustainable development program. Most OTI activities are short in duration and seek relatively short-term outcomes. Some involve capacity and institution building that may merit or require continuation in order to realize objectives or enhance the chances for sustainability. Activity continuation or bridging is an important way for OTI to ensure the long-term effectiveness of its short-term transition assistance.

The CDIE evaluators identified numerous examples where DG or other entities had initiated followon grants or were likely to do so as OTI phased out. Examples include:

- *Continuing media-strengthening efforts with Internews.* As noted above, DG was negotiating a followon grant to undertake additional capacity and institution-building efforts.

- *Linking advocacy and economic growth.* With OTI funding, the Indonesian Forum was conducting research on revenues in two districts to identify issues associated with decentralization. In addition, OTI-funded parliamentarian training included decentralization of finances. These activities complemented the EG team's capacity building for decentralization of revenue. PKPEK, an organization promoting community economic development (and a recipient of OTI support for an anticorruption campaign), subsequently received EG funding for identifying and advocating policies favorable to micro- and small business. The EG team had offered a former OTI grantee and environmental advocacy group, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup, financing for an analysis of the social costs of pollution.

- *Continuing the civilian-military relations program.* The DG team was assessing whether to continue support in this area. The OTI-funded NDI grant was expected to end in mid-2001.

[46] Yayasan Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil (YASPPUK).
[47] PLIP-Mitra Wacan.

- *Building on civil society support.* OTI recommended that DG consider giving long-term capacity-building grants to 30 of its qualified and well-performing grantees. DG was considering funding a number of these. In some cases, OTI provided bridge funding while DG developed long-term grants. Examples include:

  - DG provided funding for the Southeast Asian Press Alliance, previously supported under the OTI-funded Internews grant.

  - The DG team leader visited Surabaya in September 2000 and was expecting to fund several of the nine organizations interviewed, including Forum Kota.

  - YASPPUK, a foundation for women in small business, received OTI assistance for activities on women's rights in a democracy and other civic education. DG was planning to provide a two-year grant to this organization.

  - YLBHI, a legal aid foundation, benefited from OTI interim funding for urgently needed support—technical assistance, related travel, equipment, and office space—until both DG and Canada could establish longer term grants.

  - Wahana Lingkungan Hidup, an environmental NGO in Surabaya, was developing a proposal for longer term funding from DG.

  - Koalisi Perempuan, a women's coalition NGO previously supported by OTI, later received support from DG for addressing Japanese war crimes against women and for civic education and leadership training for women.

  - Yayasan Tunas Bangas, funded earlier by OTI for local election campaigns, anticipated receiving long-term support from DG for public debates and information campaigns on regional issues, including decentralization.

  - Yayasan Cakrawala Timur, a foundation located in Surabaya, was discussing a long-term grant with DG to support public discussion of civic issues, including those related to regional autonomy.

  - Lembaga Consumer Pers, a media watch group in Surabaya, was seeking long-term support from DG.

  - Mitra Wacan, a women's organization in Yogyakarta, had sent a proposal to DG for conducting talk shows on women's participation in regional autonomy.

Other USAID teams and donors have already built on OTI's initiatives or plan to do so. The increased integration and coordination of programs under the 2000 Strategic Plan helped nurture opportunities for effective bridging. Early planning for turnover would facilitate OTI's playing an effective bridging role.

In summary, transition assistance can help quell immediate crises. But it is not a panacea for dealing with fundamental, deeply rooted political issues that will take a broader and sustained effort to address—issues such as civilian-military relations, sectarian and ethnic

violence, and sustainable media development. The optimum is to have a combination of short- and long-term approaches available for use, especially during periods of intermittent conflict.

OTI and DG programs together contributed to the successful holding of elections. OTI successfully initiated a variety of voter education, media-strengthening, and civil society mobilization efforts to inform the public on participation and democracy issues. Building on election experiences, some grantees launched postelection activities.

The media-strengthening initiative was timely and effective. It contributed to the short-term objective of informing the public on political issues and to longer term sustainable development goals of institution building, including a legal framework.

Civil society support is providing individual emerging NGOs with opportunities to carry out effective activities that inform the public on political issues and advocate reforms, some of which had national impact. It also improved NGO capacity to use media. Assessing the overall impact of civil society activities is difficult without a monitoring system that collects data on a shared result.

OTI has a comparative advantage in addressing conflict-prone crises, including the capacity to assess needs rapidly, identify key regional contacts, and respond quickly. Its quick-action, swat-team approach in East Timor and Aceh demonstrated this.

Changing civilian-military relations will require an effort beyond OTI's tenure to realize sustainable results.

Activities addressing the cross-cutting theme of gender promoted women's issues or increased political awareness. Some activities had national impact.

Several OTI initiatives effectively bridged to long-term institutional development, including media-strengthening efforts and the identification of promising emerging NGOs with dynamic leadership to receive long-term capacity-building grants.

Lessons Learned

1. Transition assistance planning needs to balance flexibility with program integration.

Retaining flexibility to experiment and shift emphasis is important in planning transition assistance. But this approach needs to be balanced with greater program integration to reduce overlap, facilitate monitoring and reporting, and ease program handoff. The OTI planning process in Indonesia allowed for flexibility to experiment and to shift emphasis to permit quick and responsive actions. However, the process also led to program overlap with the mission's democracy program, redundant reporting and monitoring systems, and difficulty capturing overall USAID program impact. The FY 2000 strategic plan for Indonesia better adapted the OTI program to the country context and focused the bulk of the efforts on conflict reduction. This change helped reduce program overlap, ease program handoff, and enhance opportunities for integrated monitoring. More effort to integrate monitoring systems would enable USAID/Indonesia to better report on overall results.

2. Enhancing coordination between transition assistance and other programs can encourage integration and cooperation.

It is important to achieve effective coordination between OTI transition assistance and other USAID programs in a country. Effective coordination requires mission leadership, clear definition of roles and authorities, administrative systems that encourage integration and cooperation, and understanding of each other's roles and approaches. In Indonesia, numerous factors initially supported rivalry rather than coordination between the OTI and mission democracy programs. One was USAID/Washington's decision to launch a broader OTI program than recommended by the mission director. Another was the differing structures, roles, and lines of authority for program management under the respective bureaus (the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, which managed transition assistance, and the Asia and Near East Bureau, responsible for other USAID programs). A third factor was the lack of understanding of or appreciation for each other's roles, priorities, and approaches. A fourth factor was the congressional earmark designating OTI as implementer of development assistance funds programmed for Indonesia. Finally, other factors were related to different staff background, experience, and leadership styles.

New mission leadership took several actions to facilitate coordination, including integrating administrative services, clarifying roles and program responsibilities within the 2000 Strategic Plan, and initiating informal cross-strategic objective teams to coordinate all programs in conflict-prone areas. Another option would have been to place responsibility for all programs directly under the mission director, an approach that enhanced cooperation in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. Lack of an Agency handoff policy creates uncertainty and delay.

The absence of a clear and consistently applied policy on program duration and phaseout provided USAID with considerable flexibility in decisionmaking but also contributed to confusion and uncertainty about OTI's role, postponement of planning for handoff, and delay in identifying options to address conflict over the longer term. The decision to initiate a transition program in

Indonesia was based on consideration of important questions related to effective engagement but did not address program duration. The duration of OTI's program continued to lengthen, going from one to three years. Contributing factors included strong support by other U.S. entities for a continued OTI presence, continuing emergence of violent conflict in various outer islands of Indonesia, and delay in planning for and initiating handoff of a number of OTI initiatives.

Subsequent to the field study, OTI indicated its intent to provide postemergency response programs for a two-year period, when countries are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability. Planning for handoff early, preferably during activity design, would facilitate timelier transfer. Moreover, a clearer policy on duration—including the conditions under which a program would be extended, phased down, or phased out—would help encourage missions and regional bureaus to plan alternative mechanisms for managing OTI initiatives that will continue beyond two years.

4. Linking short-term assistance with institution building can help achieve sustainable results.

Transition assistance that links short-term assistance effectively with institution-building elements has greater potential for achieving sustainable results. Transition assistance was most effective in Indonesia when short-term efforts were linked to longer term sustainable development activities. For example, OTI's media-strengthening initiative effectively supported legal reform and capacity building as well as use of media in short-term activities such as elections, political discussions, and conflict reporting. The mission democracy staff is continuing the institution-strengthening elements for more sustainable results.

5. Transition assistance is no panacea for addressing fundamental issues.

While transition assistance can play an important role in helping quell conflict or its immediate ramifications, it is not a panacea. A sustained, long-term, and broad effort is needed to address the fundamental, deeply rooted political issues that fuel conflict. In Indonesia transition assistance was used to address conflict with small, short-term efforts that helped diminish tensions and encourage constructive action. But the short-term approach cannot address the complex, deeply rooted political issues—such as civilian-military, ethnic, and sectarian relations—that contribute to continuing conflict. A broad-based, sustained approach is needed to address underlying causes of conflict and strengthen democratic institutions. Thus, a combination of short- and long-term approaches appears to be optimum during a transition period.

6. OTI's rapid response mechanism provides quick and flexible assistance.

OTI used the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) indefinite quantities contract to implement short-term transition assistance quickly and flexibly. The approach is less helpful, however, in providing participating organizations opportunities to build institutional capacity in areas such as financial management and procurement. OTI used SWIFT in Indonesia to implement grant activities, including activity programming, financial management, and procurement. The approach facilitated the rapid programming of many

small, short-term grants to numerous emerging nongovernmental organizations with weak institutional capacity. Other USAID entities may also use the SWIFT contract for implementing short-term transition activities with emerging organizations.

7. Approaches to monitoring results should be realistic.

Short-term, flexible transition assistance does not always lend itself to the more rigorous monitoring systems characteristic of sustainable development programs. Nevertheless, a realistic approach to monitoring results can realize efficiencies. By September 2000, OTI had identified seven specific results it was seeking in Indonesia, but it had not established a formal monitoring system with indicators and data-collection methods to monitor progress. Furthermore, many of the results OTI sought were too ambitious for it to achieve on its own or were in areas where other mission programs were active. A more realistic approach is to regularly monitor the many small activities only at the output level, collecting informal impact information on an ad hoc basis. Where OTI and other mission programs are targeting similar objectives, a joint integrated monitoring system within the country strategic plan is appropriate.

Annex: People Interviewed

USAID/Indonesia (Jakarta)

Terry Myers, Director
Vikka Molldrem, Former Director
Sharon Cromer, Deputy
Lance Downing, Program Officer

Democracy/Governance Team (Civic Participation and Transition):
- Mike Calavan, Team Leader
- Dennis Wendel, Former Team Leader
- Dawn Emling
- Robert R. Hansen
- Shally Prasad
- Gartini Isa
- Mimy Santika
- David Timberline

Growth Team:
- Robert Aten, Economic
- T. Christopher Milligan, Decentralization and Local Government Team Leader
- Pamela Wolf, Senior Technical Advisor, Population/Health/Nutrition Team

Food for Peace Team:
- Herbert Smith
- Matt Nimms

Roger Heller, Executive Officer

OTI/Indonesia (Jakarta)

Karma Lively, Country Program Manager
David Blizzard, Program Manager, civilian-Military Relations
Michelle Otterman, Program Manager
Ely Chrisma, Project Management Assistant
Zullia Saida, Program Specialist
Restau Pratiwi, Program Specialist

OTI/Washington

Chris Phillips, Director
Jim Lehman
Chris O'Donnell
Tom Stukel, Consultant

Other USAID/Washington

Jennifer Windsor (former DAA/G/DG)
Gary Hansen, G/DG

Development Alternatives Inc.(DAI), SWIFT/Indonesia (Jakarta)

Gerald F. Becker, DAI Country Manager
Zaim Saidi, Institutional Development Specialist
Erika L. Kirwen, Program Manager
Sofyan Lubis, Grants Manager

DAI, SWIFT/Surabaya

Laurie Pierce, OTI Program Manager, Surabaya
Members of Surabaya Team

U.S. Embassy

Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard
Ted Lyng, Political Officer
Vicky Alvarado, Political Officer

Implementing Partners (U.S. & Indonesia)

The Asia Foundation, Jakarta
- Douglas E. Ramage, Representative to Indonesia and Malaysia
- Hana A. Satriyo, Program Officer

Brawijay University Faculty of Law, Surabaya
- Ibnu Tricahyo, Lecturer
- Bapak Syafaat, Lecturer

Internews, Jakarta
- Director and Staff

Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy), Jakarta
- Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, General Secretary

Aantarini Arna, Legal Literacy National Presidium
Lembaga Consumer Pers (Press Consumers' Foundation), Surabaya
- Bapak Hendrik

Munarsih, Journalist, Radio Republik Indonesia
- Other team members

Mitra Wacana Pusat Layanan Informnasi Perempuan (Women's Resource Center), Yogyakarta
- Renny A. Frahesty, Executive Manager

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
- Blair King, Senior Program Officer

PKPEK (Association of Study and Development of a People's Economy), Yogyakarta
- Idham Ibty and team

PROPATRIA (Towards a Democratic Society), Jakarta
- T. Harry Prihatono, Executive Director
- Dr. S. T. Teng, Board of Directors

Pusat Pengenbangas Sumberdaya Wanita (Center for Women's Resources Development, Jakarta
Nani Zulminarni
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Forum for Environment), Surabaya
S. H. Susianto, Executive Director
Yayasan Cakrawala Timur, Surabaya
Karyono, Director
Beka Ulung Hapsara, Research and Development
Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation), Jakarta
Petra de Leeuw, Coordinator
Yayasan Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil or YASPPUK (Foundation for Women in Small Business), Jakarta
Dr. Titik Hartini
Yayasan Tunas Bangsa,Yogyakarta
Hazwan Iskandar Jaya, Program Manager
Sutomo Parastho
Tjuk Suhana
Yadmin

Other Donors

Stephen Weaver, First Secretary (Development), Canada

Other

Heather McHugh, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (former OTI)